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ABSTRACT 21	  
The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, 22	  
rare in non-human animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in 23	  
economic experiments.  The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent 24	  
theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation 25	  
games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and 26	  
punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We 27	  
show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more 28	  
likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. 29	  
These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that 30	  
reputation is key to the evolution of punishment. 31	  
 32	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1. INTRODUCTION 36	  
Punishment of non-cooperators often promotes cooperation in humans (Yamagishi 1986; Fehr 37	  
and Gächter 2000, 2002; Rockenbach and Milinski 2006; Sigmund 2007) and other animals 38	  
(Bshary and Grutter 2005; Raihani et al. 2012). When punished, non-cooperators are more 39	  
likely to cooperate not only with the punisher but also with other social partners. Although 40	  
usually conferring benefits on the punisher's social group on the long run (Yamagishi 1986; 41	  
Fehr and Gächter 2000; Gächter et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2009), punishing defectors is costly to 42	  
the punisher. Thus, punishment has often been perceived as truly altruistic (Fehr and Gächter 43	  
2002; Barclay 2006) and its evolutionary significance as puzzling (Dreber et al. 2008; Rankin 44	  
et al. 2009; Tao et al. 2009; Wu et al. 2009; dos Santos and Wedekind 2012). 45	  
Reputation within a social group, for example by using an individual’s “image 46	  
scoring” or “standing”, has been proposed as a potentially important mechanism to explain 47	  
cooperation in humans (Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Milinski et 48	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al. 2002; Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002; Nowak and Sigmund 2005). Several findings 49	  
suggest that reputation could also be important for the evolution of punishment. For example, 50	  
humans playing an ultimatum game reject lower offers when they know that others will learn 51	  
about their acceptance threshold (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). They also seem to be more 52	  
likely to punish as the number of observers increases (Kurzban et al. 2007), and punishers in 53	  
public goods games are perceived as more “group focused" and receive more monetary 54	  
benefits in a consecutive trust game (Barclay 2006). However, previous experimental studies 55	  
on human punishment have either not allowed for reputational effects, or the kind of 56	  
reputation that could built up was not clearly defined because reputational effects of punitive 57	  
actions were potentially confounded with reputational effects of cooperative actions (Fehr and 58	  
Gächter 2000; Rockenbach and Milinski 2006; Dreber et al. 2008; Gächter et al. 2008; Rand 59	  
et al. 2009; Ule et al. 2009; Wu et al. 2009). 60	  
Theory predicts that individuals benefit from taking the likelihood of being punished 61	  
into account (Brandt et al. 2003; Gardner and West 2004; Hilbe and Sigmund 2010). 62	  
Punishing defection can then, on the long run, be advantageous to the punisher and hence 63	  
evolve if it builds up a punishment reputation (Hilbe and Sigmund 2010; dos Santos et al. 64	  
2011; Hilbe and Traulsen 2012). This leads to two key predictions: (i) humans use reputation 65	  
to discriminate between non-punishers and punishers and are more cooperative to the latter, 66	  
and (ii) the immediate costs of punishment are compensated over time by the additional 67	  
cooperation the punisher receives from punished and observers. We tested these predictions in 68	  
a helping game with observers and with the option of punishment. Experimentally controlling 69	  
for potential reputational effects of cooperation and defection allowed us to specifically test 70	  
the significance of a potential punishment reputation. 71	  
 72	  
2. METHODS 73	  
A total of 163 students played in groups of seven to nine (after written informed consent was 74	  
obtained). Players in isolated cubicles could push buttons inside a box that was connected to a 75	  
switchboard by a tangle of cables (Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002). The experimenter read 76	  
the game instructions (supplementary material) and distributed player IDs in a procedure that 77	  
ensured full anonymity (Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002). Each player received an initial 78	  
amount of 20 CHF that could be used in a game. Final gains were paid out as in Wedekind 79	  
and Braithwaite (2002).  80	  
 One player was put in the Donor role, another in the Receiver role. The Donor 81	  
(indicated to the player via a small bulbs inside the box) could either refuse to donate or 82	  
donate to the Receiver by paying 1 CHF for the other to receive 2 CHF (we donated the 83	  
difference). The Receiver could then decide whether or not to "make the Donor lose money" 84	  
by accepting a cost of 1 CHF for the Donor to lose 2 CHF. Then a next pair of players was 85	  
chosen. Each player played once per round as Donor and twice per two rounds as Receiver 86	  
(e.g. once in rounds 1 and 2 each, or twice in round 2 only). The total number of rounds (16) 87	  
was not communicated to the players. 88	  
During the first 8 rounds, the Donor’s decision (but not his/her ID in order to control 89	  
for potential confounding reputational effects (Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Wedekind and 90	  
Braithwaite 2002)) was displayed on a projector screen to all players. We also displayed the 91	  
Receivers’ ID and his/her punishment score, i.e. an arrow wandering on a scale from -5 or +5, 92	  
starting at 0, changing +1 for every punished and -1 for every non-punished defection. From 93	  
round 9 on, we either removed the punishment option but continued to display the last 94	  
punishment reputation the players had earned (“NOPUN/REP”, n=36, 4 groups), left the 95	  
option to punish but removed the display of reputation (“PUN/NOREP”, n=36, 4 groups), or 96	  
changed nothing (“PUN/REP”, n=91, 11 groups; the larger number of groups under these 97	  
control conditions allowed us to further analyze the within-group correlations between net 98	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gain and punishment reputation after 16 rounds of undisturbed interactions).  The 99	  
“NOPUN/REP” treatment allowed us to test whether donors would either reward punishers 100	  
for incurring the cost of disciplining non-cooperators or just stop discriminating between 101	  
punishers and non-punishers in the absence of the threat of punishment. The “PUN/NOREP” 102	  
treatment allowed us to assess the effect of punishment alone on the cooperation frequency. 103	  
Players in the later two treatments were only informed at the end of round 8 about the change 104	  
of rules. 105	  
The statistical analyses were carried out with R 2.10.1 (R Development Core Team 106	  
2010). We used the lme4 package for linear and logistic mixed-effect models (Bates and 107	  
Sarkar 2007) that it is suitable for unbalanced designs (Baayen et al. 2008). Linear mixed-108	  
effect models were used to analyze group cooperation and punishment frequency during 109	  
rounds 1 to 8 and 9 to 16, with group as random effect. Generalized linear mixed-effect 110	  
models were used to analyze Donors’ probability of giving, with group and donor as random 111	  
effects.  112	  
 113	  
3. RESULTS 114	  
By the end of the first 8 rounds, high probabilities of punishing defection lead to high levels 115	  
of cooperation (Fig. 1a), and more cooperative groups reached higher total payoffs than less 116	  
cooperative groups (r = 0.74, n = 19, P < 0.001). Within the controls (“PUN/REP“) the effects 117	  
of reputation did not seem to change over the full 16 rounds (likelihood ratio test (LRT), 118	  
interaction between punishment score and round: χ2 = 0.12, P = 0.73; effect of round: χ2 = 119	  
2.24, P = 0.13). The within-group correlation between net gains (i.e. sum of received 120	  
donations - punishment costs) and final punishment reputation ranged from r = -0.80 to 0.78 121	  
in the controls. These within-group correlations could be significantly predicted by a 122	  
discriminant score that was the mean difference between the Receivers’ punishment score 123	  
when the Donor gave and did not give (Fig. 1b; the early interactions during a game seemed 124	  
important here: the more individuals punished during the first 4 rounds, the higher their 125	  
discrimination score at the end of the game, linear mixed-effect model, t = 2.23, P = 0.03). 126	  
  During the experimental stage, i.e. from round 9 to 16, the frequency of cooperation 127	  
did not significantly change in the controls (Fig. 2a; LRT: χ2 = 2.55, P = 0.11) but declined in 128	  
both the PUN/NOREP and NOPUN/REP treatments (Fig. 2a; Table 1). In parallel, the 129	  
probability of punishing defection declined when punishment could no longer affect 130	  
reputation (Fig. 2b; Table 1). In the controls, Donors were more likely to give to Receivers 131	  
with high punishment score than to those with a low punishment score (Fig. 2c, Table 1). In 132	  
the PUN/NOREP treatment where no further punishment reputation could be built up, the 133	  
updated punishment score that would correspond to the Receivers’ actions but was no more 134	  
displayed did also not seem to affect the Donors’ decisions (LRT: χ2 = 0.25, P = 0.61; Fig. 135	  
2c). Correspondingly, the within-group correlation between the players’ account and their 136	  
probability of punishing defection was significantly higher in the controls than in the 137	  
PUN/NOREP treatment (Welch t-test: t12.95 = 3.14, P = 0.007). In the NOPUN/REP treatment, 138	  
where punishment was no longer an option, the reputation that had been built up until round 8 139	  
did not seem to affect the Donors’ decisions either (LRT: χ2 = 0.09, P = 0.76; Fig. 2c ).  140	  
 141	  
4. DISCUSSION 142	  
Recent theory predicts that punishment has either evolved in another context than cooperation 143	  
(Dreber et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2009) or that reputational effects compensate for the costs of 144	  
punishment (Hilbe and Sigmund 2010; dos Santos et al. 2011). We found the latter to be true. 145	  
High levels of cooperation were maintained when punishment could build up a punishment 146	  
reputation, and, on average, the increased cooperation fully compensated for the costs of 147	  
punishment. In groups with a high degree of discrimination between punishers and non-148	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punishers, the additional cooperation that punishers received even lead to net benefits, i.e. the 149	  
costs of punishment were then overcompensated. 150	  
Punishers in public goods games may often be perceived as trustworthy and group 151	  
focused, and may enjoy similar reputational benefits than generous people do in simple 152	  
helping games (Barclay 2006). Human punishment has even been called “altruistic” 153	  
(Yamagishi 1986; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Fehr and Gächter 2002) because people may 154	  
punish defectors even in anonymous one-shot interactions where no benefit could be gained. 155	  
However, anonymous one-shot interactions were probably very rare in human history, i.e. 156	  
punishment is unlikely to have been evolved in such interactions (dos Santos and Wedekind 157	  
2012). In our game where players could built up a reputation in repeated interactions, 158	  
punishers seemed feared rather than rewarded for altruistic behavior: Donors stopped 159	  
discriminating between punishers and non-punishers when the opportunity to punish had been 160	  
removed, i.e. the punishment reputation that had been built up before had no more effect 161	  
when the threat of punishment was removed. As a consequence, those who had invested into 162	  
their punishment reputation could not get compensated during the second part of our 163	  
experiment and finally finished with relatively low payoffs. 164	  
When humans can observe the others’ actions and can chose with whom to interact, 165	  
they sometimes seem to weight cooperation higher than punishment (Rockenbach and 166	  
Milinski 2011). Punishment turned out to be important in our experiments, but participants 167	  
could not choose their partners and it is possible that the likelihood of punishing defection 168	  
depends on whether partner choice is allowed for. Humans also tend to punish more often as 169	  
the number of observers increases (Kurzban et al. 2007). This suggests that punishment is a 170	  
strategic decision that takes aspects of the social environment into account. We observed that 171	  
the outcome of the first interactions within a newly built social group influenced later 172	  
dynamics: the participants’ willingness to give to punishers depends on what they experienced 173	  
at the beginning of a social interaction. 174	  
 175	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Figure 1. Cooperation and net gains when punishment reputation was unconstrained. (a) 248	  
Frequency of cooperation and of punishing defection per group at the end of the first 8 rounds 249	  
(Pearson’s r = 0.54, n = 19 groups, P = 0.015). (b) Relationship between the within-group 250	  
discriminant score (= the mean difference between the Receivers’ punishment score when the 251	  
Donor gave and did not give) and the correlation between net gains (i.e. sum of received 252	  
donations - punishment costs) and punishment score in the PUN/REP treatment (Spearman’s 253	  
rank order correlation coefficient = 0.84, n = 11, P = 0.002). 254	  
 255	  
  256	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Figure 2. Treatment effects on (a) cooperation frequency, (b) the probability of punishing 257	  
defection, and (c) the Donors’ probability of giving to Receivers’ with high or low 258	  
punishment scores (corrected for group and round effects). PUN/REP = punishment was 259	  
always possible and punishment reputation was continuously updated and displayed; 260	  
PUN/NOREP = punishment reputation was no longer displayed in Part 2; NOPUN/REP = 261	  
punishment was no longer possible in Part 2, but the reputation that had been built up during 262	  
Part 1 was displayed. See Table 1 for statistics. 263	  
 264	  
 265	  
 266	  
267	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Table 1. The effects of experimental treatment and the punishment score that built up during 268	  
the second part of the experiment (i.e. rounds 9-16) on (a) the frequency of cooperation, (b) 269	  
the probability of punishing defection, and (c) the Donors’ probability of giving. Linear (a and 270	  
b) and generalized mixed-effects models (c) were fitted with and without a given effect (or 271	  
interaction) in order to test if the goodness of fit between both models differed in a likelihood 272	  
ratio test. 273	  
 274	  
	  275	  
